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Assessing an airline’s competitive position is not trivial, as airlines serve many different markets with varying 
degrees of competition. Hence, networks compete against each other, meaning that the “typical” competition 
assessment at the airport- or direct route-level may not be sufficient. Fed with origin-destination data from Sabre 
Market Intelligence, this paper presents a modelling approach to assess the individual competitive position (CP) 
of airlines in intra-European air transport at the whole network level. The results indicate that LCC like Ryanair 
or WIZZ Air have a quite comfortable competitive position, while Lufthansa, Air France-KLM and BA/IAG are 
more exposed to competition. 
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1. Introduction and objective 
Given the increased presence of low cost carriers (LCC) and the existence of competing hubs dominated by 
different full service network carriers (FSNC) and their alliances, one would generally expect a high level of 
competition intensity and hence low degrees of market power and only limited needs for market regulation in the 
deregulated European air transport market. Competition analyses usually contain market structure assessments 
e.g. at the airport or national level, or for selected direct routes, employing concentration measures like the 
Hirshman-Herfindahl index (HHI). Such approaches may, however, fall short when it comes to the assessment of 
the overall, i.e. network-wide, competitive position of a carrier (Borenstein, 1992). The reason is that airlines 
serve many different (direct and indirect) origin-destination (sub)markets between which competition varies. For 
example, the competitive position (and hence potential market power) of airline X on a direct route from A to B 
will not only depend on its own (direct) supply between A and B in relation to other carriers’ (Y) direct flights, 
but also on the latters’ indirect supply from A to B via one or more hubs HY, if applicable, and vice versa.1  
 
This paper aims at assessing the competitive position of airlines in intra-European air transport at the whole 
network level, which is regarded as relevant. The term “competitive position” is defined as the position an airline 
occupies in the whole relevant market (network), relative to its competitors (see e.g. Veldhuis, 1997, or 
businessdirectory.com). The modelling approach considers a carrier’s actual competitive position (measured by 
market share) on each single OD and the relative contribution of each OD to the airline’s total output (measured 
by passenger volume). The model is fed with traffic flow data as provided by Sabre Market Intelligence at the 
OD-level as main input. Output is an indicator for the airline’s competitive position (CP) which shows the extent 
to which it is competed by other carriers, ranging from – in theory – 0.00 (all ODs purely dominated by other 
airlines) to 1.00 (no competition from other airlines). As many airlines are not financially or strategically 
independent from each other and hence should not be regarded as competitors, the analysis is also run at the 
airline group level, controlling for common ownership. 
 
This approach might provide useful, additional information e.g. for policy-makers or regulators. The application 
of the methodology is not limited to intra-European air transport market but could also be conducted for other 
regions or more specific research questions, such as mergers or the overall competitive exposition of European 
network airlines to Gulf or low cost carriers. 
 
                                               
1 Not considered here are other factors on the competitive position of carrier X on route A-B, such as competition from other airline’ routes 
from nearby airports, or from other modes of transport. 
   
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 looks at the relevant literature on the role, impact and measurement 
of competition in the airline market.  In section 3, the methodology and dataset are presented. Section 4 then 
contains the key findings and a related discussion, followed by a summary and remarks regarding possible future 
research in section 5. 
 
 
2. Background and literature review 
Monopolisation and resulting market power have proved to be an issue in the air transport value chain and here 
especially in some of the upstream markets. Examples are air traffic management (ATM), where airlines can 
usually not choose between more than one ATM providers (Button and McDougall, 2006); ground handling, 
which has – yet only partly – been opened to new competitors by EU legislation (EC, 1996; Meersman et al, 
2011); and the airport landscape, where the question of monopolies and subsequent market power is a more 
diverse one as it depends on various factors such as overlapping catchment areas and resulting airport leakage 
effects, alternative hubs, or the degree of countervailing power of the airlines (see e.g. Barrett, 2000; Button, 
2010; Maertens, 2012). 
 
In many (downstream) airline markets, in contrast, deregulation steps are widely believed to have increased 
competition, be it in form of competing carriers serving the same or alternative routes, or indirectly via hubs 
(Alderighi et al, 2005; Pels, 2008). After a ten year, step-wise process, the liberalization of the intra-EU air 
transport sector was completed in 1997 when EU-carriers were allowed to fly almost everywhere within the 
union, including cabotage, at self-determined fares (Regulations (EC) No 2407-2409/92). Other countries, such 
as the Balkan states, Norway and Iceland, followed suit, leading to the formation of the European Common 
Aviation Area (Decision of the Council and of the Representatives of the Member States of the European Union 
meeting within the Council 2006/682/EC), and the EU-US horizontal Open Sky agreement now even allows for 
almost unconstrained traffic right allocation on the transatlantic market (Decision of the Council and the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union meeting within the Council 
2007/339/EC). 
 
This new policy regime paved the way for a more competitive air transport market which is now characterized 
by more routes and lower fares, mainly driven by the emergence and subsequent growth of LCC such as 
Ryanair, easyJet and a changing number of smaller firms (Dobruszkes, 2013). Most of the FSNC have developed 
differently. Some had to downsize (e.g. CSA, JAT, LOT, Olympic, SAS…) or disappeared completely (e.g. 
Balkan, Malev, Swiss, Sabena,…), while others intensified their hubbing activities at their main airport(s), often 
in close cooperation with alliance partners, and strengthened especially their supply in long haul services. In 
addition, some FSNC founded low-cost subsidiaries in attempts to get a foot into the low cost sector and to 
benefit from cheaper operating platform for intra-European operations. Examples include Lufthansa 
(germanwings/Eurowings), IAG (Vueling) and Air France-KLM (Transavia). 
 
However, there are still air transport market segments that seem to be characterized by only limited degrees of 
competition: 
• Due to slot constraints or for other reasons, some airports are dominated by one or few airlines and/or are 
not yet served by a noteworthy number of low cost services (e.g. Frankfurt, Heathrow). The hub carriers 
operating here are supposed to have a strong market position at least in the local, direct flight market 
where they seem to be able to charge “hub premiums” – an issue which has however been discussed 
controversially in the literature: While some authors found empirical evidence for hub premiums 
stemming (partly) from market power (e.g. Borenstein, 1992; Evans and Kessides, 1993; Lijesen et al, 
2001), others shows that higher fares charged by hub carriers for flights from their hubs can be 
explained with e.g. higher service levels rather than market power (e.g. Dresner and Windle, 1992). 
• A number of nonstop routes are exclusively served by one or two carriers, often even (alliance) partners, 
which may reduce competition. Examples are Frankfurt-Brussels or Frankfurt-Zurich, which have been 
exclusively operated by the Lufthansa Group, following Lufthansa’s acquisitions of Brussels Airlines 
and Swiss, respectively. 
• In international air traffic, a number of direct country-pair markets are still monopolistic or duopolistic 
as many restrictive bilateral air service agreements only allow few carriers to operate a usually 
restricted number of frequencies.  
• And even indirect ODs are not always competed by alternative routings. For example, the airport of Graz 
is dominated by feeder services to hubs of airlines of the Lufthansa Group, meaning that indirect 
routings from most places via e.g. Frankfurt (Lufthansa) or Vienna (Austrian) to Graz cannot really be 
considered to be in competition with each other.  
   
 
As most (network) airlines serve not only isolated nonstop routes but many different “submarkets” with varying 
degrees of competition (Obermayer et al, 2013), it is not trivial to assess an airline’s “overall” competitive 
position. A quite simple approach would be to look at aggregated airline market shares at the regional (e.g. 
national) level, such as the US domestic market. Such approaches do however neglect the degrees of actual 
competition in the relevant origin-destination markets or at the airport levels. Borenstein (1992) argues that 
“measures of national concentration” are hence just “convenient reference points”. Also common are papers (e.g. 
Borenstein, 1992; Dresner et al, 1996; Ben Abda et al., 2012; Detzen et al, 2012) assessing the level of 
competition in air transport markets (mostly the US domestic market) at the direct route or airport level, 
employing indicators like the Hirshman-Herfindahl index (HHI). Examples for relatively recent papers in this 
context, but with a European focus, are Obermayer et al (2013) who estimated HHI-competition levels (based on 
carrier-specific frequency shares) and resulting price dispersion at the direct route level, and Gaggero and Piga 
(2010) who assessed route-specific competition in the UK-Ireland market to assess the impact of a potential 
Ryanair-Aer Lingus merger on route domination. The consideration of nonstop route level competition only was 
also subject of some regulatory decisions. For example, in the Lufthansa-Eurowings merger case, the 
Bundeskartellamt (German Federal Cartel Office) defined only the German domestic market as being relevant 
and not the indirect markets from German spokes via hubs to the rest of the world (Bundeskartellamt, 2001). 
 
This paper aims at providing an approach for the assessment of the competitive position of individual airlines at 
the total network level, considering actual competition in terms of market shares on all direct and indirect 
routings. This network perspective is not new, but most of the earlier papers either tackle the role of network 
competition from a theoretical or conceptual perspective (e.g. Adler, 2001; Aldeighi et al, 2005) or focused at the 
US market. An example for the latter is Borenstein (1992) who showed that HHI-concentration at the city-pair 
route level (incl. indirect routings) has decreased following the US deregulation act as airlines have switched 
their business models to hub&spoke network operations that tend to compete at the city-pair level. Veldhuis 
(1997) also looked at the network competition perspective. However, he applied a (supply-based) connectivity 
model to assess the relative connectivity performance of airports (incl. Amsterdam), while this paper takes a 
demand-perspective and bases the approach on actual passenger flows.   
 
 
3. Methodology and data 
Airline i is assumed to have an uncontested competitive position (CPi) if it was free from any competition on all 
markets it serves, while it would be heavily contested if its market shares on all relevant ODs were small. The 
relevant market is defined as all OD-relations an  airline actually sells tickets for, and hence not only the nonstop 
routes. Otherwise, large shares of the total traffic volumes of network carriers that fly passengers over their hubs 
would not be considered. 
 
The overall competitive position (CPi) of carrier i at the network level is defined as the sum over all OD-specific 
market shares (MSij) of carrier i in the origin-destination markets j multiplied by the airline-specific relevance of 
each ODj, which is measured by e.g. the number of passengers of airline i on ODj (PAXij) divided by the airline’s 
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If an airline had a market share of 100% on all ODs it serves, the CP index would take the value of 1, which 
would mean that the carrier was free from any intra-modal competition (not counting competition from similar 
routes from alternative airports, though). If the carrier’s market shares on most of the ODs were small, the CP 
index would take a low value.   
 
Passenger numbers at the origin-destination level are provided by the Sabre Market Intelligence (Sabre-MI) 
database (Sabre, 2014) for each carrier and intra-European route. This database uses validated raw bookings 
from MIDT (market information data tapes) data from the global distribution systems as its main source of data, 
combined and adjusted with data from external sources and with estimations for increasingly important direct 
bookings and charter operations.  
 
                                               
2 Alternatively, airline- and origin-destination-specific revenue passenger kilometres (RPK) or total revenues (REV) might be used to model 
the airline-specific relevance of each OD. 
   
 
In a first step, the analysis is run at the individual airline level, not controlling for groups of airlines under the 
same ownership (which might not really compete against each other). In a second run, a modified dataset is used 
in which airlines have been aggregated to airline groups, where applicable (Table 1). 
 
To scale the massive amount of data down, September 2015 is chosen as reference and not a full year. September 
is believed to be a good proxy for the annual average as this month is characterized both by solid business and 
leisure demand. Also, only intra-European traffic from, to and within the Sabre-MI regions Eastern Europe and 
Western Europe (including basically all of geographical Europe including Russia but excluding Turkey) is 
considered, as it is the aim of this paper to assess the competitive situations of airlines in the intra-European 
market. This will also allow for comparisons between LCC (which hardly serve any long haul routes) and the 
intra-European business of the FSNC.  
   
 
4. Key Findings and Conclusion 
The results show that the average CP of the Top 30 airlines (based on intra-European passenger numbers) have 
an (unweighted) average Competitive Position of 0.58, which however varies between 0.36 and 0.90 (Figure 1). 
The airlines for which a high CP value (>0.8) is reported are WIZZ Air (0.90) and Ryanair, flyBE and Aeroflot 
(0.83 each) implying that a large share of the passengers of these airlines have no alternative flight option 
between the same origin and destination airports. These results sound logical as LCCs WIZZ Air and Ryanair 
still operate many routes from airports that are neither served directly nor indirectly by any other carrier. Of 
course, especially with Ryanair who use secondary airports in some of their key cities (e.g. Stansted for London, 
Ciampino in Rome, Charleroi for Brussels…), the CP is supposed to decline if multiple airport regions instead of 
single airports are regarded as ODs. Aeroflot is the only network carrier (among the Top 30) with a CP higher 
than 0.80 which might be explained by the “remote” location of the carrier’s hub and the large number of cities 
served in Russia which are not served by many other, non-Russian airlines. 
 
Figure 1: Competitive Position of Europe’s 30 largest airlines (airline-level) 
 
 
It comes with no surprise that easyJet’s CP (0.71) is below Ryanair’s and in the same league as e.g. Air France, 
Transavia or Aer Lingus as these airlines serve more “mainstream” airports where route competition is higher. 
Air France seems to score relatively high due to a strong (monopoly) position on many French domestic routes. 
British Airways, Lufthansa, Alitalia or TAP are network carriers whose CP is between 0.5 and 0.6, meaning that 
they have a market share of slightly above 50% in the average market they serve. 
 
Airlines with a CP below 50% have only a minor market share on the average origin-destination relation they 
serve, which may mean that their fares and revenues are more exposed to competition (although this paper does 
not contain any assessment of the relation between an airline’s CP and their pricing power). Examples are 
holiday airlines Monarch (0.36) which has a high degree of overlapping routes with easyJet (given that Luton 
and Gatwick are among the biggest bases for both of them), or Condor (0.4) and TUIFly (0.41) which compete 
   
 
with many carriers on routes from Germany to the Mediterranean. A surprising result is the relatively low CP of 
KLM (0.41). One explanation may be that Amsterdam is now well served by LCC on trunk routes. 
 
One drawback of this approach is the analysis at individual airline level, meaning that all other carriers are 
treated as competitors. However, in reality, many carriers are part of the same airline group, following a series of 
mergers, acquisitions or as a result of the formation of subsidiaries. Hence, a second model run was done, this 
time for a modified dataset in which airlines were merged into airline groups (Table 1): 
 
Table 1: Airline groups 
Airline Group  Airlines 
Aeroflot Group Aeroflot, Rossiya, Orenburg Airlines, Donavia 
Air Berlin Group airberlin, NIKI, Belair, LGW 
Air France-KLM 
(AF-KLM) 
Air France, Transavia Airlines, Transavia France, Brit Air, KLM, Regional, KLM 
Cityhopper 
easyJet easyJet, easyJet Switzerland 
International Airline 
Group (IAG) 
British Airways, Iberia, Aer Lingus, Vueling, BA Cityflyer, Open Skies 
Lufthansa Group Lufthansa, Germanwings, SWISS, Austrian, Brussels Airlines, Lufthansa Cityline, 
Eurowings, Edelweiss, Air Dolomiti, Tyrolean 
Norwegian Norwegian Air Shuttle, Norwegian Air International 
SAS Group SAS, Blue1, Wideroe 
Sunexpress Sunexpress, Sunexpress Germany 
Thomas Cook Condor, Thomas Cook Airlines (UK), Condor Berlin, Thomas Cook Airlines Scandinavia 
TUI TUIFly, TUI Airlines Belgium, TUIFly Nordic, Thomson Airways, TUI Airlines 
Nederland, Corsair 
 
At airline group level, AF-KLM is 2nd in terms of passengers and easyJet slips to third place. The CP of AF-
KLM reaches 0.66, which is higher than KLM’s CP of 0.40 and smaller than Air France’s CP of 0.71 when 
calculated separately. The CPs of the big three FSNC groups, AF-KLM, Lufthansa and IAG, are relatively close 
(0.66, 0.63 and 0.63, respectively). 
 




Measuring an airline’s competitive position is complex as airlines serve many different (direct and indirect) 
markets with varying degrees of competition. Hence, networks compete against each other, meaning that the 
“typical” competition assessment at the airport- or (direct) route-level may not be sufficient in all cases. 
   
 
 
Based on traffic flow data at the OD-level, provided by Sabre Market Intelligence, this paper presents an 
approach to assess the competitive position (CP) of airlines at the network level, considering the actual 
competitive positions on each single OD in relation to competing carriers, as well as the relative importance of 
each OD in terms of OD passengers in relation to the airline’s total passenger number. Large OD markets where 
an airline can operate free from competition contribute with a high value to the overall CP (which can take a 
maximum value of 1.00), while small OD markets where an airline has only a small market share will contribute 
only marginally. 
 
Results for Europe for September 2015 indicate that low cost carriers like WIZZ Air (0.90), Ryanair or hybrid 
carrier FlyBE (0.83 each) score highest. This means that they only face limited competition on the ODs they 
serve. This does also apply to Aeroflot which serves many OD pairs for which most passengers do not chose 
other carriers, probably for geographical reasons. Heavily exposed to competition are leisure carriers like 
Monarch (0.36) which has a high degree of overlapping routes with easyJet, or Condor (0.4) and TUIFly (0.41) 
which compete against each other and many fellow carriers on routes to the Mediterranean. 
 
The paper also considered the airline group level, to control for common ownership of carriers. It was found that 
Lufthansa Group (0.63), Air France-KLM (0.66) and IAG (0.63) all score at a similar level. Our results are 
expected to change soon, e.g. due to the airberlin-Eurowings and airberlin-TUIFly cooperations envisaged for 
2017. 
 
Our approach might be useful e.g. for policymakers or regulators. For example, in cartel cases on mergers that 
might result in route or airport dominance, it could be worth looking at an airline’s overall CP value (and at the 
simulated CP value for the merged firm) before e.g. imposing route- or airport-specific limitations. Other, topical 
cases for the application of this approach could be questions such as on the competitive impact of low cost 
carriers or gulf carriers on the European network carriers. The latter tend to complain that more and more traffic 
rights for Gulf carriers would mean more (and unfair) competition for them, but it should be investigated if there 
really is that much competition at the actually relevant OD-levels, given that the focus of FSNC like Lufthansa is 
on the Europe-North East Asia axis while Gulf carriers are strong to South East Asia and Oceania.     
 
There is a range of limitations to the approach. First, only the competition intensity on the same OD-pairs is 
considered, neglecting any competition from similar routes operated from and/or to alternative airports. Hence, 
the model should be enhanced to account for this, e.g. in defining multiple airport regions. In addition, the 
relative importance of the ODs at the carrier level could be modelled in weighting the OD-specific competitive 
positions CPij with revenue shares (REVij/REVi) rather than passenger shares, as those might better serve as 
proxies for the importance of each OD from the carrier’s perspective. What is more, the role of alliances and 
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